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Abstract
Emergent properties of global political culture were examined using data from theWorld
History Survey (WHS) involving 6,902 university students in 37 countries evaluating 40 fig-
ures from world history. Multidimensional scaling and factor analysis techniques found only
limited forms of universality in evaluations across Western, Catholic/Orthodox, Muslim, and
Asian country clusters. The highest consensus across cultures involved scientific innova-
tors, with Einstein having the most positive evaluation overall. Peaceful humanitarians like
Mother Theresa and Gandhi followed. There was much less cross-cultural consistency in
the evaluation of negative figures, led by Hitler, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein.
After more traditional empirical methods (e.g., factor analysis) failed to identify meaningful
cross-cultural patterns, Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) was used to identify four global repre-
sentational profiles: Secular and Religious Idealists were overwhelmingly prevalent in
Christian countries, and Political Realists were common in Muslim and Asian countries. We
discuss possible consequences and interpretations of these different representational
profiles.
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Introduction
As processes of globalization connect the world [1], an important question arises: what might
be the basis of any possible global political culture? If such a confluence is likely, cultures with
different historical trajectories and political traditions will need to find ways to work together
not only economically, but also politically. In this evolving framework of globalization, tradi-
tion, according to political theorists following Edmund Burke [2] provides a “general bank and
capital of nations and of ages” (p. 144) that is a superior guarantor of social order and societal
well-being compared to abstractions like “liberty” and “the rights of man” as emphasized in the
French Revolution. How history is represented is an important warrant of legitimacy, or “char-
ter” for global political order, and the emergence of a diverse but interconnected world political
culture [3], [4]. Through the embellishment of history into tradition [5], historical figures per-
ceived and evaluated as either positive or negative become embodiments of national political
cultures that may collude or collide against one another. This paper aims to shed some light on
how historical figures are perceived and evaluated and whether there are consistencies or in-
consistencies across 37 countries.
Acquiring representations of major historical figures is a principal mechanism through
which political socialization occurs. For example, some of the first robust political knowledge
acquired by a child is beliefs about the character of the chief executive of their land [6], [7].
American children learn about “Honest Abe Lincoln” and “George Washington not telling a lie
about chopping down the cherry tree” [8], [9] as morality tales through which virtues suitable
for participation in liberal democracy are communicated [10]. Chinese children may learn in-
stead about the strength Mao Zedong demonstrated swimming the Yangtze River in his 70s
(signaling the start of the cultural revolution) and the Qin Emperor escaping assassination to
unify China (popularized in movies like Zhang Yimou’sHero) [11]. These contrasting morality
tales about the invincibility of central authority accord with variances in power distance [12]
across national political cultures and they make the point that people’s interpretations and
evaluations of who is a “hero” and who is a “villain” in world history differ across countries.
However, in the absence of large-scale cross-cultural surveys of figures in world history, the
question of the existence of shared understandings of “heroes” and “villains” across countries
remains open. An equivalent understanding of these figures could help us begin to understand
some components of what might constitute "global political culture”. The outcome of this issue
connects to lively debates across the social sciences about the nature, extent and universality of
the cosmopolitanism emerging from globalization [13], [14].
Some culture theory in anthropology [15] and major cross-cultural theories in psychology
[12], [16] concur that the world can be carved up into regions or cultural zones where different
modal understandings are likely to emerge. However, anthropologists have also focused on
processes by which the boundaries between countries have become more fluid, allowing people
to have more contact with each other and a “cultural flow of capital, people, commodities, im-
ages and ideologies through which the spaces of the globe are becoming increasingly inter-
twined” (p. 2) [17]. Authors such as Appadurai [18] have theorized that mass media and
migration have created multiple landscapes of global cultural flows characterized by complexity,
overlap, and disorder, where new forms of identity formation that are often de-territorialized
emerge in reaction to dominant Western influences [18], [19]. This contrasts with the more or-
derly conception of globalization associated with cosmopolitan theorists such as Nussbaum
[13], who sees no conflict between being a citizen of the world and local identifications, but
rather argues for education that builds up broader and broader concentric circles of identifica-
tion around the self to finally encompass humanity. Her conception is consistent with ideas
about the global circulation of Western ideologies, composed of elements from an
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Enlightenment worldview valuing freedom, equality, democracy and rationality, which act as
ideological formations that work to produce a cultural homogenization of the world [17], [20].
Such formations are highly controversial [14], [21].
Research on political culture [22] has, to-date, focused exclusively on the persistence of dem-
ocratic cultures and regimes, which seems an imbalanced proposition for a century where, for
example, the rise of non-democratic China has been so salient. Indeed, Fuchs [22] closed his
chapter on political culture with a call for “broadening the scope of the paradigm to countries
that have either autocratic regimes or are regimes in the democratization process” (p. 179). He
further questioned whether “the influential bearers of the political culture in those [non-
democratic] regimes are average citizens” (p. 179). The current research broadens the scope of
our understanding of political culture in non-democratic or recently democratizing states by
examining how some of the most important figures in world history are represented across cul-
tures, including many non-Western cultures and non-democratic states. In so doing, we begin
to form an understanding and to answer the question of whether and how political culture in
these states is carried by ordinary (albeit educated) citizens.
Given that the survey methods employed here require literacy and some knowledge of world
history, our investigation is necessarily restricted to people living with modernity, but goes be-
yondWestern forms of modernity. The more extensive (and frequently cosmological) concepts
of personhood examined by anthropologists like Fowler [23] are outside the scope of this inves-
tigation. We accept his position that “since personhood is heavily entangled with other factors
of identity, there can be no single definition that applies to all contexts, nor any single process
through which personhood is attained” (p. 156). The context examined here is underpinned by
the contemporary state, through one of its key socializing institutions-education in particular—
at secondary and higher levels.
In a related study [24], involving university students in 30 countries around the world, it
was found that 40 of the most important events in world history were not evaluated in a univer-
sally shared way. Instead, “Historical Calamities”, “Historical Progress”, and “Historical Resis-
tance to Oppression” were identified as specific latent factors (or concepts) carrying discrete
forms of shared evaluative meaning about historical events across cultures. Every country had
similar ideas about what events were regarded as calamitous (e.g., the World Wars, atomic
bombings, global warming), while there was less evaluative agreement on progress (e.g., digital
age, man on the moon, Industrial Revolution) and considerable disagreement about resistance
to oppression (or Human Rights, e.g., American Civil War, abolition of slavery, Fall of the Ber-
lin Wall). Multilevel analysis found that individuals who viewed “Historical Calamities” less
negatively and “Historical Progress”more positively were more willing to fight for their coun-
try in a war. The size of these relationships varied across cultures, and the placement of these
events on an overall multidimensional space of meaning also varied considerably according to
the cultural zone of the people rating the events. Events that have radically transformed West-
ern societies, such as women’s emancipation, did not fit into a stable position in a multidimen-
sional space or contribute reliably to any cross-cultural scale measures because of disputation
around their evaluative meaning in different cultural zones [24]. These findings suggest limited
universality of cross-cultural meanings regarding important events in world history, even
among a restricted sample of educated young people.
Historical figures, however, may serve a different function in national political cultures
compared to events. Historical figures can symbolize, objectify [25] and embody national [8]
and civilizational political cultures, whereas critical events like World War II are more like cul-
tural schemata that may be invoked or mobilized as lessons to justify action [4], [26]. Events
impart lessons, whereas “heroes” embody values and inspire actions [27]. Both must be inter-
preted through cultural frames: to paraphrase Marshall Sahlins, “Culture does not make history
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so much as make sense of it” [28]. In common language, it is easy to talk about Christian, Con-
fucian, Buddhist, or Mohammedan civilizations, referring to founding historical figures in a
way that is much more difficult for an event. This is because Jesus, Confucius, Buddha, and
Mohammed have come to embody values and teach philosophies for living with greater sa-
lience than events [29], [30], [31]—they are interpreted to have exerted systematic agency on
the course of human events [28].
Hence, our initial research questions are descriptive. Among 40 of the more important fig-
ures in world history (see Procedure and Material section for description of the selection of the
historical figures), who are regarded as the most positive and the most negative? Are these eval-
uations consistent or inconsistent across cultures and congruent clusters of countries? Is there
consistency in the types of figures evaluated as good and bad across cultures and such cultural
zones? Answers to these questions will inform us of a potential emergent global political cul-
ture: If consensus exists as to the “heroes” and “villains” of world history, then these figures
should symbolize the values and achievements that humanity aspires to and humanity, as a
whole, rejects. Folk psychologies are rich in theories about people and may supply meaningful
structure to evaluative ratings of historical figures: Scientists, presidents, dictators, and human-
itarians are all familiar social categories that may be employed to shape person perception of
historical figures [32], [33], [34].
Based on the results of our earlier research [24], we anticipate a lack of universality in the
evaluation of major figures in world history. We expect that figures are likely to be the object of
nationalistic social identification [26], [29]: An American is far more likely to identify with
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln (and therefore rate them more positively) than
Mao Zedong or Sun Yatsen, whereas the opposite pattern is likely to be true for people living in
China. To the extent that national “heroes” (or “villains”) anchor the dimensions of variation
for the evaluation of figures in world history, we might therefore expect different dimensional
spaces to emerge in different parts of the world, suggesting regional variations in global politi-
cal culture. However, given the prevalence of cultural interchange, and previous research show-
ing the preeminence of Western influences in history around the globe [35], [36], an analytical
strategy based on a priori country based differences was deemed inadequate. A new concept,
namely, that of representational profiles [37], is introduced to measure emergent ensembles of
meaning that may hold across cultures, but retain a commitment to group-based and plural
structures of meaning.
Historical Representational Profiles
We employ Latent profile analysis (LPA) to build a typology of the responses shared between
individuals as a way to manage this heterogeneity and expected plurality of meanings. We term
these classifications of patterns of individual differences in rating historical figures “representa-
tional profiles” [37].
We define a representational profile as a set of discretely measureable attitudes and beliefs
bound together by a system of meaning that is used by people to make sense of a particular so-
cial object, such as figures in world history [28]. Each representational profile is a configuration
of attitudes and beliefs that can be communicated in a meaningful way to other people who
may or may not agree with this point of view. LPA maintains an ontological commitment to
groups without requiring an a priori commitment to the representations being a property of
pre-existing social categories, like nationality or ethnicity. We show how the two techniques
can work hand in glove to capture the complexity of how people express their beliefs and views
about historical figures in a worldwide data set.
"Heroes" and "Villains" of World History
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Method
Participants
Data were collected initially from 6,902 university students who were citizens of 37 countries
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Fiji,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Sin-
gapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tunisia, UK, and USA). Sample sizes ranged
from 78 (Peru) to 346 (Argentina) with an average of 182; most were collected between 2007
and 2008, but the UK sample was collected in 2010. Social science students were preferred, and
specialists majoring in history were avoided. Participants with more than 33% missing values
were excluded from the overall analyses (175 cases) because they were deemed to have demon-
strated insufficient knowledge/interest in historical figures. Additional missing data in the
LPA was estimated using FIML. The final sample thus consisted of 6,727 university students
(60.8% were female, 36.7% were male, and 2.5% did not indicate their gender). Participants’
age ranged from 16 to 80 years (M = 21.73, SD = 5.19), with country age means ranging from
19.00 (Philippines) to 34.09 (Pakistan). This sampling approach ensures that our findings
and conclusions derive from a truly cross-cultural sample that is not WEIRD (ie. Western-
Educated-Industrialized-Rich-Democratic) [38]. Yet, the sample is homogenous in terms of
educational levels, enabling us to be confident about the comparability of our findings
across cultures.
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington
(VUW), New Zealand (0479JUN; 5th of June 2007). All data collection took place in universi-
ties with predominately undergraduate students in accord with the ethical regulations of that
institution. The research was always anonymous, an information sheet was supplied, verbal in-
formation was always issued, potential participants were able to ask questions before filling-out
the survey and informed consent was always implied by voluntary participation as set out in
sections 4.1, 4.5(d) and 4.8(g) of the Human Ethics Policy of VUW. Potential participants were
provided with information regarding the content of the study, the length of the survey, the pro-
cedures for anonymizing responses and the option to withdraw from the study at any stage
without having to give reason and without any negative consequences. Regarding the proce-
dures for the anonymizing of responses, participants were informed that data recorded in the
study would be aggregated so that individual persons would not be identifiable. Feedback was
provided through a written debriefing according to regulations set out in section 7, Appendix 1
of the Human Ethics Policy of VUW. In countries in which there were no ethics committees,
the New Zealand ethics regulations were followed. The age of the university students depended
on the graduating age of the local schooling systems in the participating countries. Participants’
privacy, rights and welfare were protected throughout the entire research procedure.
Procedure and Materials
The survey consisted of a set of 40 historical figures. The choice of 40 historical figures was
based on open-ended nominations from 24 countries [35], [36] using the criterion that a figure
had to be among the top 10 people nominated in two or more countries. This was augmented
by the inclusion of religious founders, who were mainly excluded from the previous research
because of a 1000 year time limit for nominations. All questionnaires were translated from
their original language into the language prevalent in the countries of administration and
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back-translated to ensure correct translation. Instructions for the participants were as follows:
“Below is a list of historical figures. Please rate the intensity of your positive or negative feelings
about each person (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = extremely negative, 4 = neutral, and 7 = extremely
positive), and how important you think each person is (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = not at all im-
portant, 4 = fairly important, and 7 = extremely important). Please rate all the people, even if you
don’t knowmuch about them.”After this instruction the list of historical figures followed.
Results
If not otherwise mentioned, we used SPSS 18 for all statistical analyses. Table 1 shows all fig-
ures sorted by descending means across all samples. The means overall were calculated on the
basis of the mean per country. By doing this we eliminated the influence of the sample size.
The 10 most positively evaluated historical figures across all countries were (in descending
order): Albert Einstein, Mother Theresa, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Isaac Newton,
Jesus Christ, Nelson Mandela, Thomas Edison, Abraham Lincoln and Buddha. These are scien-
tists, humanitarians, and religious figures with one exception of a political leader (Abraham
Lincoln). It seems reasonable to argue that maybe Abraham Lincoln was perceived as a human-
itarian, since it is known that he abolished slavery in the United States. The five most negatively
evaluated historical figures across all countries were (from the bottom): Adolf Hitler, Osama
bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, George W. Bush and Joseph Stalin. These are 20th and 21st centu-
ry figures known for their roles in dictatorships, terrorism, mass murder, and/or driving their
countries into unjust wars. They were followed by Mao Zedong, Vladimir Lenin, Genghis
Khan, Saladin and The Qin Emperor. The last two had evaluations close to the neutral point of
4.04 and so are not evaluated as “villains” by our samples. Clearly time has dimmed the fero-
cious reputation of Genghis Khan, whose rating also approached the midpoint.
Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) [39] were calculated for all 40 evaluations of figures
(see Table 1). An ICC greater than. 05 indicates a higher proportion of consistency (or correla-
tion) in variability accounted for at the between-country level relative to variability between in-
dividuals within a country whereas an ICC lower than. 05 indicates relatively more variability
accounted for at the individual level than at the country level [39], [40]. As seen in Table 1,
some variation was available to be accounted for at the country level for most ratings of figures.
In other words, the higher the ICC, the greater the cross-cultural compared to individual differ-
ences. The highest ICCs were for Saddam Hussein (0.27), Osama bin Laden (0.25) and Sun
Yatsen (0.26), all figures who were evaluated more positively in one cultural zone compared to
all others (Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein higher in Muslim, Sun Yatsen higher in Chi-
nese societies). The lowest ICCs in terms of evaluations were for the Qin Emperor (0.04) who
was rated as neutral in all countries, and Isaac Newton (0.05) and Albert Einstein (0.06) who
were positively evaluated in all countries. This reflects an underlying agreement across all
countries that Albert Einstein is a positive figure whereas Osama bin Laden draws different
evaluations from Muslim and non-Muslim countries. These and other additional analyses are
available from the authors on request.
Among the top 10 most admired figures in world history, there was more consensus across
countries about Buddha, Newton, Einstein, Mother Theresa and Mandela; in descending order,
there was less consensus about Edison, Gandhi, Christ, Martin Luther King, and the least con-
sensus about Lincoln. The pattern suggests that scientists are most consensually evaluated as
“heroes” across cultures, together with religious and humanitarian figures who are unambigu-
ously associated with peace. At the bottom, there was less consensus about the evaluation of
historical figures, with Saddam Hussein having the highest ICC of any figure, and Osama bin
Laden, Stalin, and Mao having the 3rd, 4th, and 5th highest ICCs in the inventory. The average
"Heroes" and "Villains" of World History
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Table 1. Descending means (M) evaluations of ﬁgures, standard deviations (SD) and Intraclass
correlation coefﬁcients (ICC) across 37 nations.
Evaluations of Figures
Figure M SD ICC
1. Albert Einstein 6.11 1.07 0.06
2. Mother Theresa 6.07 1.17 0.08
3. Mahatma Gandhi 5.90 1.19 0.13
4. Martin Luther King 5.84 1.15 0.17
5. Isaac Newton 5.74 1.14 0.05
6. Jesus Christ 5.55 1.48 0.14
7. Nelson Mandela 5.48 1.30 0.09
8. Thomas Edison 5.39 1.25 0.11
9. Abraham Lincoln 5.18 1.21 0.19
10. Buddha 5.06 1.51 0.04
11. Princess Diana 5.04 1.32 0.08
12. Columbus 5.03 1.31 0.07
13. Martin Luther 5.02 1.31 0.07
14. Bill Gates 4.95 1.40 0.09
15. Pope John Paul II 4.83 1.46 0.18
16. Mohammed 4.83 1.45 0.14
17. Franklin D. Roosevelt 4.82 1.21 0.10
18. George Washington 4.79 1.27 0.11
19. Karl Marx 4.79 1.38 0.12
20. Confucius 4.75 1.27 0.11
21. Alexander the Great 4.74 1.22 0.07
22. J.F. Kennedy 4.73 1.17 0.07
23. Winston Churchill 4.62 1.16 0.09
24. Che Guevara 4.60 1.31 0.09
25. Margaret Thatcher 4.34 1.28 0.12
26. Charlemagne 4.31 1.04 0.10
27. Sun Yatsen 4.21 0.86 0.26
28. Gorbachev 4.19 1.16 0.04
29. Deng Xiaoping 4.10 0.92 0.18
30. Napoleon 4.07 1.40 0.07
31. The Qin Emperor 4.00 0.96 0.04
32. Saladin 3.97 1.02 0.08
33. Genghis Khan 3.81 1.21 0.14
34. Lenin 3.66 1.36 0.15
35. Mao 3.50 1.33 0.19
36. Stalin 2.84 1.30 0.21
37. George Bush Jr 2.58 1.46 0.13
38. Saddam Hussein 2.41 1.26 0.27
39. Osama bin Laden 2.17 1.29 0.25
40. Adolf Hitler 1.76 1.15 0.16
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.t001
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ICC for the bottom eight (the only real “villains” in terms of mean scores) was. 18 compared
to. 10 for the top eight. There was thus more agreement across cultures about the “greatest he-
roes” of world history compared to its “worst villains”. In Fig. 1, the distribution of the ICCs
and the evaluations are plotted. In the upper left quadrant where Saddam Hussein and Osama
bin Laden are located was the most variability between the countries moving to the lower right
quadrant where there was more similarity between the countries.
We attempted next to map the figures into a meaningful two-dimensional space using a
multidimensional scaling procedure (MDS) with Proxscal and subsequent generalized procrus-
tes analysis (GPA) [24]. MDS places objects or in this case the evaluated figures that are similar
regarding their evaluation closer together in the MDS space. For example, if Stalin and Hitler
are both evaluated negatively, they would be closer together in the MDS space. One could also
say that the MDS provides a depiction of the relationships between the figures regarding their
valence. When the objects are placed into a two-dimensional space, the researcher has to make
sense out of the structure and interpret the dimensions in a meaningful way. GPA then rotates
the two-dimensional structure to the point where the differences between all countries become
the smallest. Although we removed multiple figures in an attempt to increase the fit (or the
similarity) between countries, we were unable to improve the fit. We therefore decided to re-
duce the number of countries by using a standard hierarchical cluster analysis (CA) which
aims to discover fairly homogenous groups of cases. CA commonly uses an algorithm starting
with each case (= country) as separate clusters and then continuously clusters these cases until
only one cluster is left. The procedure does this by progressively placing objects into clusters
which contribute the least error variance.The cluster analysis was based on 35 countries,
Fig 1. Intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) and Evaluations scatterplot.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g001
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excluding France and Mauritius. A four cluster solution was superior to a 3, 2 or 1 cluster solu-
tion, due to lesser increase of the sum of squared errors.
The cluster analysis thus converged on four clusters of countries: a Catholic-Orthodox (or
traditionally Christian) cluster (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Hungary, Mexico, Peru,
Portugal, Russia, Spain), a mainly Western cluster (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Fiji,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Switzerland, UK, USA), a
Muslim cluster (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tunisia), and an Asian cluster (China, Hong
Kong, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan).
Having a reduced set of coherent groups in the form of four country clusters, we repeated
the MDS procedure with a subsequent GPA with the following results. The rotated centroid
configuration accounted for 69% of the squared distances for two dimensions of evaluations of
figures. This was not a satisfactory improvement. The two-dimensional spaces for historical
figures were relatively similar only for the first two clusters consisting of predominantly Chris-
tian populations. As shown in Fig. 2, the Catholic/Orthodox cluster had two clearly interpret-
able dimensions: The vertical axis represents positive-negative evaluation, with negative figures
at the top and positive figures at the bottom, and the horizontal axis might be termed a "West-
ern Dominance" dimension, with "Western Dominance" to the right and "Resistance to Domi-
nation" on the left hand side. The MDS for the Western cluster (see Fig. 3) was similar,
suggesting a shared knowledge between the two clusters. The placement of a few of the histori-
cal figures varied across the two clusters, with the religious figures Christ and John Paul II hav-
ing a more positive location for the Catholic/Orthodox cluster than for the Western cluster.
Fig 2. Rotated MDS solution for the Catholic-Orthodox (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia,
Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain) cluster with all 40 figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g002
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TheWestern cluster may thus apply more secular criteria to evaluations than the Catholic/
Orthodox cluster.
Interpretation for Fig. 4, the Muslim cluster, is more complex. The vertical axis is still
positive/negative, and the general location of most individual figures along this evaluative di-
mension is reasonably consistent across clusters. Mohammed’s placement in the middle of this
dimension is, nonetheless, problematic. On the other hand the horizontal axis is completely
distinct: To the left side are all four of the Muslim historical figures, and to the right are a di-
verse range of others who can only be described as non-Muslim. This suggests an alternative
knowledge structure onto which the current selection of 40 figures does not map out very well.
More Muslim figures would be needed to uncover the full range of latent meanings behind the
ratings of historical figures for Muslim countries.
The horizontal axis of the Asian cluster MDS is not straightforward either, as can be seen in
Fig. 5. Pope John Paul II, Princess Diana, George W. Bush, Jesus Christ, and Che Guevara, an-
chored the left side of the space. The peaceful and democratic Sun Yatsen was on the right side
of the MDS anchored by Charlemagne, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, and Saladin. One potential
Fig 3. Rotated MDS solution for theWestern (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Fiji, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Philippines, Switzerland, UK, USA) cluster with all 40 figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g003
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interpretation of the horizontal axis is that it captures diverse aspects of history. More recent
figures are on the left and ancient figures on the right. With the exception of the religious fig-
ures that could be regarded outside history in many respects due to their continuity as salient
figures in people’s lives. This is, however, a highly speculative interpretation. The vertical axis
could be interpreted as a positive-negative dimension where negatively evaluated historical fig-
ure were anchored on the top and positively evaluated figures at the bottom. It is possible that
the Asian cluster may be aggregating across too much variability by combining data from com-
munist China with democratic India (but a 5 or 6 cluster solution did not resolve this issue).
The issue that some figures may not be known in some countries adds to a more complex and
diverse representational space of historical figures here.
Since our attempts to find universal dimensions of meaning somewhat failed, we decided to
introduce a new type of statistical analysis that to our knowledge has not heretofore been em-
ployed in dealing with large scale cross-cultural data. It does not presume country as a unit of
analysis but rather constructs groups of individuals using an inductive procedure that analyzes
the configuration of their responses.
Latent Profile Analysis (LPA)
In the next step, we employed a LPA for the evaluation of 28 historical figures using Mplus
[41]. We used LPA to explore how a set of unobserved subgroups of participants may differ
Fig 4. Rotated MDS solution for the Muslim (Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tunisia) cluster with all 40 figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g004
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reliably in their views of a topic. The set of unobserved subgroups then represents a categorical
latent variable (that is a set of distinct categories or types of people) that we hypothesized were
producing the overall pattern observed in our data [37]. LPA thus allowed us to create a model
categorizing people into different subtypes or categories that are theorized to underlie the over-
all pattern of responses. LPA has been used to identify different categories or types of people in
a range of different research areas: the majority of this work has been in epidemiology where
LPA has been used to model disease prevalence [42]. LPA has also been used in various areas
of social psychology [37], including research assessing the proportions of people who hold dif-
ferent combinations of religious beliefs [43] and different combinations of sexism [44].
LPA is suited for identifying distinct groups or types of people who may have quite a differ-
ent set of beliefs or evaluations of different sets of historical events or figures in world history
from other distinct types or groups of people. These different types may be overlooked when ex-
amining the overall mean levels of responses to a set of attitude or opinion items. Our analysis
differentiates people in our data set into latent profiles based on similarities and differences in
their overall pattern of responses across a range of continuous indicators—as noted previously,
different groups appear to rate controversial figures like Stalin or Mao very differently, and it
cannot be assumed that country or culture is the primary determinant of these variances [18].
We examined a range of different solutions, with models ranging from one to five latent
profiles. We examined the Sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion (SABIC) and
entropy as indicators of model fit. The SABIC can be used to compare a series of models that
differ in the number of parameters. Entropy values range from 0 to 1.0, where a high value in-
dicates a lower classification error. Entropy values close to 1.0 (and typically above. 80) indicate
Fig 5. Rotated MDS solution for the Asian (China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan) cluster with all 40 figures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g005
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that there is a clear separation of classes, or in other words that the model clearly separates
the data into distinct profiles. SABIC and entropy statistics for the different solutions were
as follows: single-class solution SABIC = 649585.54; two-class solution SABIC = 638239.86,
Entropy = .822; three-class solution SABIC = 631105.97, Entropy = .870; four-class solution
(preferred) SABIC = 627066.55, Entropy = .823; five-class solution SABIC = 624197.31,
Entropy = .814.
The SABIC and entropy statistics indicated that a four profile solution provided a reason-
ably parsimonious model of the latent profiles (or discrete categories of people) underlying the
observed data. This was further supported by inspecting each solution qualitatively, which in-
dicated that the fifth and subsequent solutions simply provided incrementally finer splits in
the profiles identified in the four-class solution without showing any distinctly new patterns
(i.e., splitting one class into two profiles that followed the same pattern across all items, but
with one class a little higher in terms of mean evaluations than the other). Likewise, a three-
class solution did not provide a fine-grained enough solution and failed to differentiate be-
tween the religious and secular idealist profiles identified in the four-class solution.
The estimated mean level of evaluation of each historical figure for each of the four represen-
tational profiles [45] is presented in Fig. 6. After considerable discussion among the authors,
we labeled these historical representational profiles “Secular Idealists” (42.7% of the total sam-
ple), and “Religious Idealists” (31.4%): together they are termed “Historical Idealists”. Between
them may be communicated dominant features of Western discourses concerning historical
figures, as a dialogue between secular and (Christian) religious ideas and values. They are con-
trasted with “Political Realists” (15.6% of the total sample), and “Historical Indifferents”
(10.3%). The names chosen for these profiles are highly interpretive. The co-authors on this
paper debated these names for two months before settling on the current nomenclature. We
caution that these percentages reflect an over-abundance of samples fromWestern countries
(especially from Europe), and in no way mirror the overall population of the world.
Fig 6. Estimated means for a four-profile Latent Profile Analysis evaluation of historical figures, ordered from left to right according to positions in
factor structures (American Presidents, Humanitarians, Explorers, Tyrants, Communists, Conquerors, Religious, Scientists, and Other).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g006
"Heroes" and "Villains" of World History
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641 February 4, 2015 13 / 21
Each of these groups appears to represent latent profiles of people that configure the evalua-
tion of historical figures in different but meaningful ways. “Historical Indifferents” were the
smallest group in terms of both percentages (10.3%) and showed the least propensity to evalu-
ate historical figures in a manner that reflects deeper meaning: In this representational profile,
all figures except Hitler and Bush were rated between 3 and 5, many near the (unlabeled) scale
midpoint of 4. This class viewed historical figures with indifference (and lack of knowledge
most probably) rather than seeing them as “sinners” or “saints”. On the other hand, the group
with the most extreme evaluations were “Religious Idealists”, the second largest class (31.4%):
They rated great “Scientists” and “Humanitarians” exceptionally high, “Religious Founders”
very highly, were fond of “American Presidents”, and rated “Anti-Heroes” and “Communist
Dictators” (excluding Marx himself) extremely negatively. The pattern of their ratings is similar
to the largest class, “Secular Idealists” (42.7%) who differed from “Religious Idealists” in that
they were more moderate in their evaluations overall, particularly in rating religious figures. In
these two profiles, “Conquerors” were rated close to the midpoint. The different categories
(“Scientists”, “Humanitarians”, and so forth) are based on a factor analysis which is not re-
ported here due to space restrictions and can be obtained from the authors on request.
These two profiles differed sharply from the fourth class, termed “Political Realists”
(15.6%). In this profile, “Anti-Heroes” were rated moderately (close to midpoint), “Communist
Dictators” and “Conquerors” were rated somewhat positively, and Karl Marx was rated highly.
It is tempting to refer to this class as “Machiavellians”, but in the end we opted for the more
evaluatively neutral term. Rather than being purely “Machiavellian”, the “Political Realists”
were in line with the “Historical Idealists” in rating “Scientists” and “Humanitarians” highly,
and they favored the more theoretical idealists Marx and Lenin over “Communist Dictators”
who held power and influence for longer periods of time. They rated “Religious Founders” in-
termediate between the two profiles of “Idealists”, showing more admiration for religious au-
thority than the “Secular Idealists”.
We next examined the patterning of cultural differences in each of the four historical repre-
sentational profiles. We refer to this as prevalence mapping, in that we sought to map the preva-
lence of the four representational profiles in different countries. As can be seen in Fig. 7 (with
country details available in Table 2), there were clear differences in the distribution of profiles
across regions and countries within regions. Countries in the Western and Catholic/Orthodox
clusters tended to contain “Secular” and “Religious Idealists”. These two clusters were similar
in the distribution of prevalence mapping, as they were similar in terms of multidimensional
scaling. The Western cultural zone was the most homogenous, consisting almost entirely
(88%) of “Historical Idealists” (the summed proportion of “Secular Idealists” and “Religious
Idealists”). This was compared to 81% “Historical Idealists” in the Catholic/Orthodox country
cluster. These numbers reflect the overwhelming influence of Western liberal democratic ideals
in “grasping together” [44] or interpreting [46] history among university-educated circles in
these predominantly Christian countries. The dialogue between religion and secularity in these
countries continues to constitute a source of dialogical and representational dynamism.
Countries in the Muslim cluster, by contrast, tended to contain more “Political Realists”
(39%) and “Historical Indifferents” (30%). Countries in the Asian zone displayed complex pat-
terns that are harder to summarize, because of the heterogeneity of countries in this zone. Over-
all there was a high proportion of “Political Realists” (30%) and a similarly high proportion
of “Secular Idealists” (34%) but fewer “Religious Idealists” than in the Western or Catholic/
Orthodox clusters (21%) (see Fig. 7). The Chinese sample consisted almost entirely of
“Political Realists”, whereas the proportions of the four clusters were almost equal in the Indian
sample. Singapore, on the other hand, looked a lot like Western countries in its prevalence map
(see Table 2).
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Discussion
Several key insights were obtained through analysis of the World History Survey (WHS) exam-
ining evaluations of 40 major historical figures from 6,902 students across 37 countries. We are
now in a position to make empirically verifiable statements about what global political culture
might look like through the lens of young educated adults’ views of historical figures.
Cross-Cultural Differences and Similarities
First and foremost, we found limited evidence for universality in evaluations of significant fig-
ures in world history. Even at the level of regional clusters, our sample of Asian countries pro-
duced a multidimensional scaling space for evaluations of historical figures that were not easily
interpretable, and the Muslim cluster produced a dimensional space that in no way resembled
that for the Western and Catholic-Orthodox clusters. However, there were several specific
findings that indicated some commonality in representations of history across countries.
First, there was a high level of global consensus around the virtue of scientific figures: Al-
though all the great scientist figures in the WHS were Westerners, attitudes towards them seem
to have transcended in-group favoring or out-group denigrating cultural lenses. Einstein was
the most highly rated figure in world history, Newton was 5th, and there was little variability in
their ratings across cultures. In terms of global political culture, the first salient aspect of it, at
least among university students, is that the pursuit of scientific excellence appears to be evaluat-
ed in a pan-cultural manner: that is, positively across all sampled cultures. Further research
should explore whether this finding holds in non-tertiary-educated samples, where enlighten-
ment values may play a less decisive role.
Following closely behind science, there were a number of humanitarian and religious figures
dedicated to championing human rights, relieving human suffering, and providing non-violent
Fig 7. Distribution of historical representation profiles across cultural zones.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.g007
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resistance to imperialism, colonialism, and racism who were also very highly regarded. Here
there was less consensus than for the scientific figures. Mother Theresa was the second most
positively evaluated figure in world history, whereas the other peaceful humanitarians Gandhi
and Martin Luther King had slightly lower ratings and more cross-cultural variability. Race
and gender were no barriers to favorable evaluations. Two of the 10 highest rated figures were
Black and two were Asian (Indians); thus four of the 10 most highly rated figures in world his-
tory were non-White (about the same ratio of non-Whites in the WHS as a whole, 15 of 40).
Two of the top 11 were women.
Association with warfare exacted a penalty on evaluations: among war leaders, only Lincoln
was among the top 10 most positively evaluated figures. These student samples appeared to
Table 2. Proportion of sample classiﬁed as belonging to each representational proﬁle by nation and by cultural cluster.
Cultural Cluster Nation Secular Idealists Religious Idealists Historical Indifferents Political Realists Sample Size (N)
Catholic/Orthodox Argentina .62 .23 .07 .08 346
Brazil .43 .34 .10 .13 209
Bulgaria .42 .47 .04 .07 237
Colombia .39 .31 .12 .18 159
Hungary .48 .43 .06 .02 184
Mexico .31 .31 .08 .29 198
Peru .49 .40 .04 .08 78
Portugal .45 .46 .05 .04 189
Russia .33 .22 .28 .17 214
Spain .63 .29 .05 .02 231
Western Australia .57 .31 .09 .03 179
Austria .49 .45 .04 .02 194
Belgium .73 .24 .01 .02 136
Canada .48 .45 .04 .04 195
Fiji .31 .42 .09 .18 165
Germany .75 .19 .05 .01 146
Italy .41 .54 .02 .03 141
Netherlands .70 .27 .01 .02 199
New Zealand .53 .37 .03 .07 150
Norway .74 .23 .02 .01 177
Philippines .25 .46 .06 .22 330
Switzerland .74 .20 .04 .02 142
UK .49 .30 .13 .08 118
USA .37 .62 .01 .00 253
Muslim Indonesia .17 .25 .24 .33 198
Malaysia .13 .14 .44 .30 197
Pakistan .15 .09 .31 .44 106
Tunisia .16 .08 .11 .66 93
Asian China .05 .05 .07 .82 182
Hong Kong .19 .11 .34 .36 151
India .20 .26 .22 .34 200
Japan .53 .18 .16 .13 111
Singapore .57 .24 .09 .10 220
South Korea .39 .19 .12 .30 217
Taiwan .42 .36 .08 .15 284
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115641.t002
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imbue war leaders in history with a substantial degree of agency in pursuing warfare (e.g., hold-
ing them responsible by evaluating them lower) in a manner that could interpreted as in accord
with Sahlins’ [28] view that individual characters tend to come to the fore as historical actors
when something momentous and fraught occurs.
Second, the impact of time could clearly be seen. For example, the very recent figure of
George W. Bush was rated as more negative than Joseph Stalin, who was responsible for innu-
merably more deaths. The effects of temporal distance can also be seen from the almost neutral
rating received by Genghis Khan, which is not the result one might have expected given the
amount of human suffering and cultural destruction he unleashed on the 13th century. Such
mid-point ratings were also given to Saladin and the Qin Emperor, also ancient conquerors
and empire builders, and to Napoleon, who is not as ancient, but considerably less controver-
sial today than he would have been in the 19th century. Time seems to push these historical
conquerors towards neutral evaluations as living memories of them fade [47], [48] or are sim-
ply not that well-known.
Third, and perhaps most importantly respondents regarded figures associated with the rise
of human rights and resistance to oppression with a relatively high degree of positive consensus.
That is, there was more consensus about the positive valence of particular historical figures com-
pared to the historical figures evaluated as negative in world history. While the genocidal Hitler
was undisputed as the worst rated figure in world history, his ICC (showing cross-cultural dis-
agreement) was much higher than that for the benevolent figures of Albert Einstein and Mother
Theresa. Even more controversy surrounded Osama bin Laden and SaddamHussein, who were
rated close to the midpoint in our small (n = 4 countries) and non-representative (mostly Asian
countries) sample of Muslim nations but negatively everywhere else.
Our findings thus seem to suggest that where evaluations of negative figures in particular
are concerned, there may be highly in-group favoring discourses that provide means-ends jus-
tifications for rating figures like Mao, Stalin, and Lenin favorably and Osama and Saddam to-
wards the midpoint. That is, according to ingroup accounts, Mao, Stalin and Lenin may have
“made mistakes”, but they also made hard choices required for nation-building, whereas
Osama and Saddam may be viewed as “fighters against Western imperialism”. We suspect that
these means-ends justifications of less favored figures are culture-specific, and may counter the
homogenization of global political culture among young educated people even though there is
substantial agreement about its “heroes” and preferred values. From our MDS analyses, it ap-
pears that some Asian and Muslim countries may have alternative systems for mapping the
meaning of figures in world history, supporting Sahlins’ [28] contention that culture provides
the means to make sense of history. Unfortunately, we did not have enough Muslim and Asian
figures to fully map out this meaning space; there is also some doubt as to whether such figures
would be coherent across the whole spectrum of different Muslim and Asian countries. The
Western and Catholic-Orthodox clusters that share civilizational roots as predominantly
Christian countries appeared to also share a similar view of world history as emanating from
positive advances from the West and reactions to them [48]. But of course, the generality of
these findings is limited by our university educated samples, and the fact that the availability
and affordability of tertiary education varies widely across cultures. Furthermore, a more com-
prehensive sampling of countries would add to the confidence of the cultural zone cluster clas-
sifications that we have produced.
Representational Profiles
Our analyses of representational profiles revealed a gap betweenWestern and Catholic/Orthodox
clusters versus Muslim and Asian countries clusters in prevalence mappings. TheWestern
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clusters and Catholic/Orthodox clusters consisted almost entirely (88%) of “Historical Idealists”,
whereas the Muslim cluster had a plurality of “Political Realists” (39%) and “Historical Indiffer-
ents” (30%). The “Historical Indifference” found in Muslim countries may be a product of a re-
jection of Eurocentrism in the selection of historical figures (including relatively few Muslims).
The Asian country cluster was more of a hybrid, containing a plurality of “Secular Idealists”
(34%) and “Political Realists” (30%).
This pattern of cross-cultural similarities and differences is useful for understanding the
roots, branches, and future trajectories of nascent global political culture. First, the similarities
between Western countries and Catholic (mainly Latin American) and Orthodox (mainly
post-Communist) countries in our sample suggest that university-educated young people in
these countries have ensemble representations of historical figures strongly influenced by West-
ern liberal democratic ideals. History is a crucial symbolic resource [4] for legitimizing political
systems, and our findings suggest a dialogical process by which governments are called upon to
live up to their often unfulfilled ideals by exceptional figures, like the Gandhis and Martin Lu-
ther Kings of the world, who are then valorized subsequently by large numbers of their educat-
ed citizens (who might have opposed their liberalizing agendas during the great humanitarians’
lifetimes). We could argue that an End of History in Fukuyama’s terms [20] is indeed taking
place, where the most enduring form of social order is liberal democracy. However, it is clear
that even this “end” at times will be characterized by a fierce debate between “Secular” and “Re-
ligious Idealists” in Western and Catholic/Orthodox countries. Cosmopolitan theorists such as
Nussbaum [13] have had to contend with criticism that their formulations of the global citizen
are too much based on Kantian ideals of rationality, and not sufficiently grounded in more in-
tuitive feelings [49], and less tolerant identities such as religious ones [14], [21].
Our four Muslim countries provide a powerful counterpoint against over-generalizing this
pattern, made all the more poignant by the fact that one of the four samples was Tunisia, the
tinderbox that started the so-called Arab Spring. In a global representational framework, it is
incumbent upon the citizens of Western countries to understand that the overwhelming sup-
port for “Historical Idealism” prevalent in their countries is not universal, and cannot be ex-
pected to be transplanted without growing pains to Muslim countries. Rather, we should
anticipate a long trajectory of democratization in these countries rather than an unbroken
chain of immediate successes, as localized and marginalized formations are very important
even in the analysis of cosmopolitanism [50]. Because we only included four Muslim figures in
the World History Survey, and because differences between university and non-university edu-
cated are likely to be important, there is much research to be done on representations of history
in Muslim countries.
Asia contained such a diversity of attitudes and beliefs about history that the MDS for the
region was very complex: it is organized as a geographical rather than as an attitudinal whole in
our data [51]. How can a single representation accommodate both India’s democracy and the
Market Leninism of China? In this region, aggregating across seven countries, there was both a
high prevalence of “Secular Idealists” (but not “Religious Idealists”) and “Political Realists”,
showing respect for Western icons of liberal economics and a respect for the top-down, author-
itarian traditions that governed Asia prior to recent times in many places [11]. This prevalence
mapping shows signs of a fully-engaged dialogue between Western traditions of historical in-
terpretation, rooted in liberal ideals of free trade, private property, democracy, and human
rights on the one hand, and Asian traditions, rooted in sovereign wealth, collectivist schemes of
ownership, autocratic governance, and ethics of hierarchical relationalism on the other [49],
[50]. The heterogeneity of these representations co-occurs with the construction of hybrid
forms of governance from the family-based democratic oligarchies in the Philippines to “So-
cialism with Chinese characteristics” in China and the one-party democracies of Singapore
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(and late 20th century Japan). Such diversity of solutions to issues of the authority of leaders
and governance is an important legacy of history to global political culture that cannot and
should not be swept away under homogenizing discourses involving modernity or globaliza-
tion [52].
Conclusion
We are at a juncture in time where the world is becoming fully connected economically [1].
Understanding the structure and evaluation of global ratings of historical figures allows an un-
derstanding of what emergent global political culture might look like as a parallel and culturally
distributed system. The core of the “big picture” identified in this research is one that acknowl-
edges the dominant influence of the “Historical Idealism” rooted in Western civilization, but is
fully inclusive of the diversity of global political culture that exists in large parts of the Islamic
world and Asia. Our method of ascertaining representational profiles underlines that different
positions across countries are not restricted by a priori factors like nationality or religion, but
are acknowledged as alternative branches of global political culture that are marked by different
historical trajectories emerging out of different cultural origins.
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